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Synopsis
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1986
Nineteen eighty-six witnessed the adoption of "Resolution H" of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Con-
vention), dealing with deep seabed mining. While the United Na-
tions General Assembly reaffirmed its support of the LOS Conven-
tion, only seven nations ratified or acceded to the Convention in
1986. Some success was seen in fishing treaties and protection of
marine mammals. Renewed concern surfaced regarding pollution
of our oceans. Lastly, a long-brewing controversy between the
United States and Libya erupted into a military confrontation in
March, creating the major territorial dispute of 1986.
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, positive steps were taken toward better management of
the resources of the world's oceans. The most significant step was the
Preparatory Commission's adoption of the Statement on the Imple-
mentation of Resolution II of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)." This statement dealt with ef-
forts to mine the deep seabed. Also, many nations demonstrated
their concern for the living creatures of the sea through efforts to
protect various species and to control pollution. Political concerns
were raised as the island nations of the South Pacific asserted their
independence, while the United States and Libya engaged in a vio-
lent confrontation.
i. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [here-
inafter LOS Convention].
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Ratification Status
The LOS Convention was adopted on April 30, 1982, and opened
for signature on December 10, 1982. As of the closing date, Decem-
ber 9, 1984, 159 countries had signed the LOS Convention.2 Subse-
quently, concern has arisen that, without the unanimous acceptance
of its principles, the LOS Convention will not be able to achieve its
goal of resolving, in one agreement, all issues relating to the law of
the sea.3 Nevertheless, in 1986, the United Nations General Assem-
bly reaffirmed its support, calling upon all states to adhere to the
LOS Convention.4
In spite of the General Assembly's resolution, only seven nations
ratified or acceded to the LOS Convention in 1986.' At the end of
1986, thirty-two countries had ratified the Convention;6 sixty coun-
tries must ratify before it will become effective.7 The Convention will
remain open indefinitely for any nation willing to accede to it.8
The United States has refused to ratify the LOS Convention due
to its provisions regarding deep seabed mining. The Convention pro-
vides that the mineral resources of the seabed and ocean floor are
beyond any nation's jurisdiction, while the United States maintains
it has the right to exploit those resources.9 The United States consid-
2. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 107. For a complete list of signatories to the
Convention, see SIMMONDS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 2 (Mar. 1986).
3. The Preamble to the LOS Convention states its goals as follows:
establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all
States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international
communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the
equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their
living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine
environment.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
4. U.N. Res. A/RES/41/34, discussed in Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y
News, Dec. 1986, at I.
5. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, July 1986, at 1; Sept. 1986, at 1;
Dec. 1986, at 1. The seven ratifying nations in 1986 include Indonesia (Feb. 3), Trinidad
and Tobago (April 25), Kuwait (May 2), Yugoslavia (May 5), Nigeria (Aug. 14),
Guinea-Bissau (Aug. 25) and Paraguay (Sept. 26).
6. U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 89. For a complete list of nations that have
ratified the LOS Convention as of September 12, 1986, see 25 I.L.M. 1367 (1986). Sub-
sequently, Paraguay has ratified the Convention. The LOS Convention will take effect
one year after the date upon which the sixtieth country ratifies it.
7. LOS Convention, supra note I, art. 308. Ratification takes place in a state's
legislative body. Article 305 defines "signature" as it is used in the LOS Convention.
Articles 306 and 307 define "ratification" and "accession" as they are used in the LOS
Convention. LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 305-07.
8. LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 306-07.
9. IssuEs BEFORE THE 41ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 104
(J. Tessitore & S. Woolfson eds. 1987) [hereinafter IssuEs]. The United Kingdom and
West Germany have not signed the LOS Convention for similar reasons. SIMMONDS,
supra note 2, at 11. For a discussion of the United States position, see Wainwright,
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ers the LOS Convention's provision contrary to accepted principles
of international law. Nevertheless, several times in 1986 the United
States reiterated its support for the LOS Convention in that it pro-
vides uniformity and stability for the law of the sea. The United
States maintains that it has accepted and acted in accordance with
the nonseabed provisions of the LOS Convention.10
Deep Seabed Mining
Despite the United States' position, much of the 1986 LOS Con-
vention activity focused on the deep seabed mining provisions. Con-
troversy arose when individual investor groups registered overlapping
claims with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to specified
areas of the seabed." In September, the Preparatory Commission for
the ISA (Commission) 2 made advances in resolving the controversy
with the adoption of a procedure and timetable for resolving overlap-
ping claims.' 3 For example, a group of four "pioneer investors" from
France, Japan, India and the Soviet Union initially applied to
register for mining seabed areas.'4 France, Japan and the Soviet
Navigation Through Three Straits in the Middle East: Effects on the United States of
Being a Nonparty to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 361, 373-80 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Marine Mammal News, Mar. 1986, at 6 (summarizing speeches by
John D. Negroponte, Assistant Secretary of State of Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs). See also Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Dec.
1986, at 2 (summarizing United States statement to the United Nations General
Assembly).
11. U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 89. The agreement ended a two-year effort to
resolve overlapping claims. For background on the controversy see SIMMONDS, supra note
2, at 9-12.
12. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the body through which the
state parties to the LOS Convention are to organize and control all resource-oriented
uses of the seabed beyond national jurisdictions. LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts.
156-57. The LOS Convention provides that after fifty signatures have been recorded, a
Preparatory Commission (hereinafter Commission) shall meet in order to establish the
institution of the LOS Convention. LOS Convention, supra note 1, Final Act, Annex I,
Res. I, art. I.
13. U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 89. See also Council on Ocean Law, Oceans
Pol'y News, Sept. 1986. The summer session of the Commission met from August 12 to
September 5, 1986, in New York, and adopted the Statement on the Implementation of
Resolution II, U.N. DOC LOS/PCN/L.41/Rev.1, Annex, Sept. 11, 1986, reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 1326 (1986) [hereinafter Statement] on September 5. Resolution II on gov-
erning Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities relating to Polymetallic Nodules,
annexed to the Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea,
[hereinafter Resolution I] appears at 21 I.L.M. 1254 (1982) and establishes a special
regime for protecting investments in future deep seabed mining.
14. U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 89. The "pioneer investor" designation gives a
state exclusive rights to explore an area and priority in authorization for commercial
Union,15 however, requested registration for overlapping areas in the
Pacific Ocean. 16 To further complicate the claims, a group of poten-
tial applicants - four consortia made up of investors from Belgium,
Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States - desired to mine those same areas.1 Also, develop-
ing countries were concerned that adequate portions of the coveted
mineral-rich areas of the Pacific be reserved for the Enterprise, the
operational arm of the ISA.18
In February, the Chairman of the Commission met with the pio-
neer investors in Arusha, Tanzania, to develop a procedure to resolve
the seabed conflicts. 9 The resulting "Arusha Understanding" (Un-
derstanding) provided for the recognition of equal areas in the Pa-
cific central zone for France, Japan, the Soviet Union and the Enter-
prise.20 The Understanding also determined which area each country
initially would receive.21 Additionally, most of the area in which So-
viet claims overlapped with those of the potential applicants was re-
served for the Enterprise and the applicants.22 With some variations,
the Understanding was adopted during the Commission's summer
session in New York as the Statement on the Implementation of
Resolution II (Statement). The Statement sets forth a procedure and
an apparently somewhat flexible timetable for resolving the overlaps
production. Resolution II, supra note 13, arts. 1(b) and 6.
15. The Indian claim, located in the Indian Ocean, involved no overlap with other
pioneer investor claims. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 5.
16. A large overlap existed between the Soviet and French sites and a small one
between the Soviet and Japanese sites. All overlaps occurred in a central zone in the
Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone, the prime nodule area of the Pacific Ocean. Id.
17. The only outstanding conflicts are between the consortia and the Soviets.
Overlaps between the consortia and the Japanese and the French were resolved in 1983.
Id. Under Resolution i, the consortia were entitled to the same privileges as the pioneer
investors so long as the consortia spent at least $30 million on seabed activities by Janu-
ary 1, 1983. Resolution II, supra note 13, art. l(a)(ii).
18. See comments of Jose Luis Jesus on behalf of the Group of 77 at the closing
of the September session of the Commission. U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 89. The
Enterprise is the name given to the mining arm of the ISA. LOS Convention, supra note
1, art. 170.
19. Council for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 5. Joseph S. Wari-
oba, chairman of the Commission, and Acting Chairman l.G. Jhingran led the discus-
sions. U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 89.
20. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 6. Additionally,
the Enterprise would receive a total of one half of the application area of each of the
three applicants as mandated by the LOS Convention and Resolution 11. Resolution II,
supra note 13, art. 3(a).
21. Resolution II, supra note 13, art. 3(a). This represents the only divergence
between the Arusha Understanding (hereinafter Understanding) and the LOS Conven-
tion. Under the Convention, the Commission had the right to preselect the first 52,300
square kilometers to be reserved for the Enterprise. Under the Understanding, it was
agreed that the first 52,300 square kilometers of a 75,000 square kilometer site was to be
divided between all three countries and the Enterprise.
22. Id.
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and for the eventual registration of claims.23
Basically, the Statement allows pioneer investors to revise their
applications by March 25, 1987,24 for submission to a technical ex-
perts' review group.25 This group evaluates the revised applications
for adherence to the requirements of Resolution II. The findings of
the group then are submitted to the General Committee, which
meets to consider the applications and to determine which registra-
tions will be allowed.2
At the time of registration, pioneer investors voluntarily may relin-
quish any claimed areas, including presumably any remaining over-
lap between the Soviet and potential applicants' claims, thereby
forming a reserve to be held by the Commission. In return for con-
cessions by the pioneer investors, each will be allowed to select inde-
pendently a large portion of the total area awarded to it.27 The ISA,
either through the Enterprise or in association with developing coun-
tries, will receive half of each application area, assuring that the En-
terprise receives an equal share of the mineral-rich central Pacific
area where most of the overlaps occur.28 Additionally, potential ap-
plicants will be allowed to file formal applications until the LOS
Convention comes into force. Furthermore, the Statement allows de-
veloping countries to apply until the LOS Convention takes effect,
provided that their applications do not prejudice either the potential
applicants or potential investors.2 9
Although the Statement constituted the major achievement of the
Commission in 1986, other issues concerning seabed mining also
were raised. In its spring session, the Commission voted to condemn
23. At the insistence of the potential applicants, the Statement included the fol-
lowing: "If the Preparatory Commission is satisfied that substantial progress has been
made during the inter-sessional discussions, but that due to lack of time it was not possi-
ble to complete the discussions, the Preparatory Commission may decide, at its next ses-
sion, to prolong the periods for discussions, as necessary." Statement, supra note 13,
para. 3. See also Council on Ocean Policy, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept. 1986, at 4.
24. Statement, supra note 13, para. 2.
25. Id., para. 4. The group, nominated by members of the Commission and ap-
pointed by the Chairman, determines whether the applications conform with Resolution
II and reports its findings to the Commission.
26. Id., para. 3.
27. Id., para. 13(2). "[E]ach applicant may indicate in its application portions of
its application area up to a limit of 52,300 square kilometers that shall form part of the
total area to be allocated to it .. "
28. Id., paras. 9, 12 & 13(l)(a). Paragraph 13(1), subparagraphs (c) and (d)
further require relinquishment of overlaps by France, Japan and the Soviet Union ex-
pressly stating the area which each must contribute to the Enterprise. Id., para. 13(l)(c),
(d).
29. Id., para. 19(e).
the United Kingdom and West Germany"0 for issuing mining li-
censes independently of the Commission.31 The Group of 7732 led the
vote. While the Western nations considered the resolution too con-
frontational,3 3 the Eastern European Group and the Group of 77
stressed that the LOS Convention must be the only regime regulat-
ing deep seabed mining. 4 In some ways, the vote merely affirmed a
1985 declaration against the United States for issuing licenses for
exploration of the seabed in 1984.35
Growing concern about the commercial viability of deep seabed
mining overshadowed all action by the Commission. The work of all
four special commissions,36 as well as the informal plenary commis-
sion, 37 reflected the current depressed financial state of mining.3 For
30. The United Kingdom issued a license to a consortium in December 1984.
West Germany issued two licenses in late 1985 to the Ocean Management, Inc. consor-
tium, which also holds a United States license, and to an all German consortium. Council
on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 4.
31. See U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 107.
32. The Group of 77 represents the developing, or "third world" countries. At the
LOS Convention, the Group of 77 actually had a membership of 120 states. See Lee,
The New Law of the Sea and the Pacific Basin, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 247, 256
(1983).
33. Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
voted against the resolution while ten Western industrialized nations abstained from the
vote. The United Kingdom and West Germany, not having adopted the LOS Convention,
are not members of the Commission. The final vote was fifty-nine to seven. Council on
Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 4.
34. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 107. The United Kingdom and West Germany
argued that since no international seabed regime eixsts, they legally could enact national
legislation authorizing licensure that subsequently would be repealed upon achievement
of an international regime. Interestingly, the United States renewed its independent li-
censure scheme with passage of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-507, 100 Stat. 1847 (1986). For a discussion of possible
consequences of operation under the dual registration system, see Jones, Risk Assess-
ment: Corporate Ventures in Deep Seabed Mining Outside the Framework of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L. 341 (1986).
35. Declaration Adopted by the Commission on August 30, 1985, U.N. Doc.
LOS/PCN/72 (1985), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, 6 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 86
(1985).
36. IssuEs, supra note 9, at 107. The regular work of the Commission is divided
into five working groups. The first special commission deals with problems of land-based
developing nations that produce minerals that will be mined from the seabed. The second
special commission considers training programs and methods to start up operation of the
Enterprise. Special commission three reviews draft regulations for a mining code. Special
commission four drafts rules of procedure for the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, which will be organized after the LOS Convention is ratified by sixty nations.
An informal plenary commission is the fifth working group.
37. The informal plenary commission, the fifth working group, considers matters
related to the implementation of Resolution II and drafts rules for administration of the
ISA. Id.
38. Id. at 106. Experts maintain that the drop in world metal prices will delay
prospects for commercial development of manganese nodules until well into the second
decade of the twenty-first century. See Dubs, Mineral of the Sea: Myth and Reality in
THE NEW ORDER OF THE OCEANS: THE ADVENT OF A MANAGED ENVIRONMENT (G.
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example, two of the special commissions were concerned with the
potential investors' abilities to meet the rather stringent Resolution
II obligations given the likelihood that they may not profit from their
mining operations for many years.39 Nevertheless, in 1986, the spe-
cial commissions continued to resolve many delays to the eventual
mining of deep seabeds 40 as well as administrative concerns relating
to the establishment of the International Tribunal on the Law of the





The United States, Japan and Canada reached agreement on a
plan to reduce Japanese catches of North American spawned salmon
in the north Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea.42 Japan agreed to
phase out the use of drift nets43 in the Bering Sea by 1994 and to
move the eastern boundary of its north Pacific fishing area about 35
miles west.44 Prior to the agreement, Japan had threatened to close
its markets to United States fishermen.45 In exchange for Japan's
concessions, the United States agreed to permit Japanese fleets to
harvest 500,000 metric tons of bottom fish from within the United
States 200-mile fishing zone in 1986.46
The initial agreement between Japan and the United States for-
mally was adopted by the International North Pacific Fisheries
Pontecorvo ed. 1986).
39. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 9-10 and Sept.
1986, at 5-6. Resolution I! requires a $1 million annual fee once registration is com-
pleted and imposes exploration, training and technology obligations. Resolution II, supra
note 13, arts. 7 & 12.
40. See U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 108-09 and Nov. 1986, at 90-91.
41. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
UNCLOS III) designated Hamburg, West Germany, as the site of the Tribunal on the
Law of the Sea. West Germany's failure to ratify the LOS Convention, however, has
raised questions about the ability of West Germany to provide a site for the Tribunal.
U.N. Chronicle, Nov. 1986, at 91.
42. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at 1.
43. The Japanese use huge drift nets that can stretch across thirty miles of ocean
to catch salmon among other fish. The amount of immature salmon spawned in Ameri-
can streams and captured by the Japanese finally led to the negotiations between the
United States and Japan. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1986, at A16L, col. 2.
44. Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1986, at 35E, col. 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
Commission.4 7 Subsequently, all three nations agreed to amend the
Annex of the Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean 48 to include the terms of the agreement. 49 Addition-
ally, all three countries signed two Memoranda of Understanding
committing themselves to increased enforcement and research
efforts.50
In contrast to the success in negotiations regarding Pacific salmon,
the United States and Canada failed to reach agreement regarding
Canadian interception of United States-bound salmon in the Atlan-
tic. 1 The United States delegation to the North American Commis-
sion of the North Atlantic Conservation Organization"2 had sought
to close fall salmon fishing in Newfoundland to allow United States
salmon to return to United States rivers.3
MARINE MAMMALS
Ironically, efforts to end commercial whaling were furthered by a
United States Supreme Court decision allowing the United States
government not to enforce legislation designed to curtail whaling.
Other efforts to protect the ocean's living creatures focused on
whales, porpoises and the establishment of a marine reserve in South
America.
Whales
The Japanese Whaling Case
A recent United States Supreme Court decision has proven to be a
major factor in ending Japanese whaling and effectuating an even-
tual moratorium on the killing of sperm whales. In Japan Whaling
Association v. American Cetacean Society,54 the Supreme Court re-
versed a lower court ruling that would have required the federal gov-
ernment to restrict Japanese fishing rights in American waters be-
cause of Japanese whaling activities.55 Nevertheless, the Japanese
47. The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission was established pursu-
ant to Article 2 of the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, done May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 [herein-
after High Seas Convention].
48. See High Seas Convention, supra note 47, Annex.
49. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 12.
52. The North Atlantic Conservation Organization was established pursuant to
Fisheries: Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, opened for signature
March 2, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10789 (entered into force in United States Oct. 1, 1983).
53. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 12.
54. 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
55. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986). For analysis of the lower court decision, see Comment,
American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge: Executive Agreements and the Constitutional
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agreed shortly thereafter to accept a moratorium on commercial
whaling, which it previously had refused to accept.56
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) 57 initially called
for an end to the killing of sperm whales in 1982 and a moratorium
on all commercial whaling by 1986. 58 Because Japan had made a
timely objection to the terms of the IWC policy, however, Japan
could not be considered in violation of international law even though
it continued to harvest more than its IWC-established quota of
whales. 59 Consequently, environmental and conservation groups in
the United States sought a court order requiring the federal govern-
ment to "certify" the Japanese and enforce sanctions against them
based on domestic legislation."0
Under United States law, a nation must be certified when it acts
to "diminish the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commis-
sion."81 The certification process results in sanctions that automati-
cally reduce by half the quantity of fish that a nation may harvest
within United States territorial waters.6 2 The environmental groups
contended that the Secretary of Commerce 3 violated a nondiscre-
Limits of the Executive Branch Discretion in American Foreign Policy, 12 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 219 (1986) (supporting the decision of the court of appeals) and Note, Constru-
ing the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments: The D.C. Circuit Court Harpoons
Executive Discretion, 61 WASH. L. REv. 631 (1986) (criticizing the court of appeals
opinion).
56. Marine Mammal News, May/June 1986, at 1.
57. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is the administrative arm of
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
58. While the ICRW adopted a schedule regulating harvest practices, the IWC is
authorized to amend the schedule with new harvest quotas. ICRW, supra note 57, arts.
1, 3 & 5. In 1981, the IWC established a zero quota for the Western division stock of
the North Pacific sperm whales. The next year it ordered a five year moratorium on
commercial whaling beginning in 1985-86 and lasting until 1990. Japan Whaling Assoc.,
106 S. Ct. at 2864.
59. ICRW, supra note 57, art. 5.
60. The domestic legislation involved included the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1983), and the 1979 Packwood
Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. § 1821 (1983).
61. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1983). The Pelly Amendment directs the Secretary
of Commerce to certify a country if "nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly,
are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the
effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program .. " Id. The Packwood
Amendment contains language specific to the ICRW, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(ii),
and further directs that the Secretary of State must act if certification occurs.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1983).
63. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) establishes authority with the Secretary of Commerce
to certify violators.
tionary duty by failing to certify Japan for its continuing whaling
activities.64 The federal government responded by claiming that a
1984 executive agreement with Japan65 presented an alternative to
certification and the sanctions that fell within the discretion of the
government to determine what activities diminished the IWC's
effectiveness. 6
A five member majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the
executive agreement, supposedly ensuring an end to Japanese whal-
ing by 1988, was a "reasonabl[e]" solution within the Administra-
tion's discretion under United States law.67 Nevertheless, four dis-
senting justices focused on congressional intent in enacting the
legislation requiring sanctions and concluded that the Administra-
tion's refusal to certify the Japanese "flouted the express will of
Congress." 68
Other Whaling Activities
United States relations with Norway and Iceland further illustrate
the power of threatened United States sanctions, as both countries
acceded to United States demands to end commercial whaling. Un-
like Japan, Norway was certified for continued whaling activities.69
Because Norway exports $143 million worth of seafood to the
United States annually,70 however, Norway agreed to stop whaling
in 1987 in exchange for a United States agreement not to impose
sanctions.7 1 Nevertheless, certification of Norway will continue until
Norway withdraws its objection to the IWC moratorium.7 2
Iceland, which halted its commercial whaling in 1985, cancelled a
planned capture of 120 whales for scientific purposes in response to
United States pressure in July 1986.7' The American fish market
accounts for thirty percent of Iceland's exports and Iceland feared
that the United States planned to impose a boycott, although the
United States denied any such plans.7 4 Despite Iceland's decision to
64. Japan Whaling Assoc., 106 S. Ct. at 2865.
65. Id. at 2864 n.l.
66. Id. at 2867. The 1984 agreement, made in recognition of the inability to en-
force the IWC moratorium against Japan, allows Japan to continue its harvest of sperm
whales until 1988 without United States imposition of sanctions. Japan agreed in turn to
end all commercial whaling in 1988. Id. at 2868 n.55.
67. Id. at 2872.
68. Id. at 2874.
69. President's Message to Congress, Norwegian Noncompliance with the Inter-
national Whaling Commission's Conservation Program, 22 WEEKLY COMlP. PRES. Doc.
1045 (Aug. 4, 1986).
70. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986, at A16, col. 1.
71. Marine Mammal News, May/June 1986, at I.
72. See id.; N.Y. Times, June 6, 1986, at A16, col. 1. Norway also agreed to kill
fewer (less than 600) whales in 1987.
73. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986, at A5, col. I.
74. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1986, at A5, col. 2.
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abort its scientific whaling activity, operations in Iceland were the
targets of the protests of an environmentalist group, the Sea Shep-
herd Conservation Society, which scuttled two whaling ships in Rey-
kjavik harbor and damaged a whale processing plant north of the
city in November.
7 5
At the 38th Annual IWC meeting in Malmo, Sweden, in June,
Sweden attempted to further restrict whaling by introducing a reso-
lution calling for a halt to scientific whaling. 78 After review, the
IWC approved only a nonbinding resolution, which provided that
whales killed for scientific purposes should be used "primarily" for
local purposes.7
Sea World Case
A recent United States appellate court decision also addressed the
issue of whale research. In Jones v. Gordon,78 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the effect of two overlapping statutes
upon whale research efforts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part the decision of the Alaska district court 9 and left
undecided the issue of when an environmental impact statement will
be required before the issuance of a permit to capture killer whales.
In Gordon, the National Marine Fisheries Service (Service)80 is-
75. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at A7, col. 1.
76. Scientific whaling is only slightly restricted under the ICRW. ICRW, supra
note 57, art. 8. Nations must send proposals for research whaling to the IWC Scientific
Committee for comment but then may issue permits without restriction. In 1985, with
the 1986 moratorium on whaling approaching, Iceland and South Korea proposed re-
search whaling that involved the killing of substantial numbers of whales and the sale of
meat and other products to support the research. Sweden proposed resolutions limiting
research whaling to non-lethal means and a ban on trade in the by-products of research
killing. Neither proposal was passed by the ICW. Marine Mammal News, May/June
1986, at 2.
77. Sweden's initial proposal to ban the sale of research by-products was renewed
in 1986. Its effect, however, was diluted as the nonbinding resolution passed which allows
research whalers to sell whale products to provide financial support for their research
efforts. The only restriction added to this resolution is that the sales should be "primar-
ily" for local use. South Korea, Iceland, Brazil, the Philippines, Japan and Norway have
all either begun research whaling or have proposed to do so. Marine Mammal News,
May/June 1986 at 2. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1986, at C3, col. I (discussion of
concern that the moratorium on whaling is breaking down).
78. 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
79. 621 F. Supp. 7 (D. Alaska 1985).
80. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 [here-
inafter Protection Act] declared a general moratorium on the taking of marine mammals
and delegated authority to implement the plan through the Secretary of Commerce to
the National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration and the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1374.
sued a conditional whale collection permit8' to Sea World, Inc. (Sea
World), the operator of aquatic zoological parks. In issuing the per-
mit, however, the Service did not require Sea World to prepare an
environmental impact statement as required under the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA). 82 The court held that the Service's
disregard of the terms of the NEPA was unreasonable. 83 The Ninth
Circuit, however, merely directed the Service to reconsider its deci-
sion rather than mandate preparation of the report as ordered by the
trial court.8 4
The possible conflict in statutes leading to the case hinged on the
length of time required for preparation of an environmental impact
statement. The length of time averaged approximately one year.85
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (Protection Act)88 requires a
ruling on an application such as Sea World's8 7 within thirty days of
the close of the comment period or hearing.8 8 Sea World claimed
that the practical impossibility of preparing an environmental impact
statement within the thirty day period precluded such a report. 89
The court, however, reconciled the Protection Act's time constraints
and the NEPA's statement requirement by recognizing that the envi-
ronmental report could be prepared before the publication of the no-
tice that begins the thirty day time period. 90 In conclusion, the court
emphasized that its interpretation served the purpose of both statutes
- protection of marine animals.91 Ultimately, the court returned the
case to the Service for the Service to provide a "reasoned explana-
tion" of why, under the NEPA, an environmental impact statement
might not be required.92
81. The Protection Act provides for an exception to the general prohibition andallows taking of marine mammals by permit for scientific research and public display. 16
U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. & 4332 (1983).
83. Gordon, 792 F.2d at 828.
84. Id. at 829.
85. The Ninth Circuit accepted for purposes of litigation Sea World's representa-tion that preparation of an environmental impact statement averaged 360 days prepara-
tion time. Id. at 825.
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
87. Sea World's application proposed the taking of up to 100 killer whales overfive years along the California and Alaska coasts. Ten were to be kept permanently fordisplay; ninety were to be kept up to three weeks for research. Gordon, 792 F.2d at 823.
88. The Protection Act provides that, after notice of a proposed permit is pub-lished in the Federal Register, a thirty day comment period follows. 16 U.S.C. §1374(d)(2). A hearing may be requested during that time period. Id. § 1374(d)(4). TheFisheries Service then is required to issue its ruling on the permit application within
thirty days of a hearing or the close of the comment period. Id. § 1374(d)(5).
89. Gordon, 792 F.2d at 825.
90. Id. at 826 (suggesting that publication of the notice of comment period bewithheld per 50 C.F.R. 216.33(a) (1985) until the impact report was completed).
91. Id. at 826-27.
92. Id. at 829.
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Protection of Other Species
Ecuador Park
In May, Ecuador established a protected area consisting of the
waters, seabed and subsoil within fifteen miles of the Galopagos Ar-
chipelago. A three month long fire accidentally started by nearby
farmers in 1985 had severely damaged much of the area.
9 4 Scientists
estimated that environmental recovery of the area could take up to
50 years.9 5 The newly established protected area adds 50,000 square
kilometers to an existing national park. 6 Ecuador also established an




The United States took unprecedented action to protect porpoises
in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by banning American tuna fish-
ing in the area.' Pursuant to the Protection Act,99 the ban was im-
plemented when the Act's quota of porpoises100 had been killed in
connection with tuna fishing efforts until the end of 1986.101 The ban
caused an estimated $12 million loss to the struggling American
fleet.10 2 Foreign tuna fishermen also were required to guarantee that
any tuna imported into the United States had been caught without
harm to porpoises.' 03
93. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, July 1986, at 3.
94. See Marine Pollution Bulletin, Jan. 1986.
95. Id.
96. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, July 1986, at 3. In 1959 Ecuador
made approximately eighty percent of the Galapagos Archipelago a national park, an
area of approximately 6,000 square kilometers.
97. Id. The LOS Convention establishes an international review procedure for the
creation of protected areas within an exclusive economic zone and requires submission of
scientific and technical evidence in support of the planned area. Following approval, the
nation may adopt laws for the area set aside. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 211,
para. 6(a). Ecuador, however, is not a party to the LOS Convention.
98. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,786 (1986).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
100. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(A)(2) (1986).
101. The 1986 quota had been set at 20,500 porpoises. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,786
(1986).
102. See Marine Mammal News, Sept. 1986.
103. No imports of tuna will be allowed until July 1, 1987 absent filed certification
that no porpoises were harmed in connection with the tuna catch. The certification proce-
dure per section 102(c)(3) of the Protection Act was amended beginning at 51 Fed. Reg.
32787.
POLLUTION
A shifting of worldwide concern about pollution, from nuclear
waste to plastic waste and ocean incineration, became evident in
1986.104 Additionally, the United States failed in an attempt to pass
major legislation related to oilspill liability.
Plastics
Each day, the world's shipping fleet discards an estimated 450,000
plastic containers into the sea; each year, fishing vessels dump over
fifty-two million pounds of plastic packaging materials and 298 mil-
lion pounds of plastic fishing gear.10 5 These discarded plastics float
on the open seas for years, killing more than two million sea birds
and 100,000 marine mammals each year through entanglement or
ingestion.108 An additional problem arises from the use of plastic
drift nets, which stretch across up to thirty miles of ocean and trap
over a million birds, small whales, fur seals, dolphins, porpoises and
salmon.1 07 Both the problems of plastic debris and drift nets were
addressed in 1986 as public awareness of the problem increased.
The Ninth Consultative Meeting of the London Dumping Conven-
tion' °1 (Meeting) unanimously approved a resolution recognizing the
harm to marine life from entanglement and ingestion of persistent
plastics. The Meeting directed its Secretariat to present the resolu-
tion to both the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
and the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environmen-
tal Protection Committee. 0 9.The Meeting later urged national ef-
forts to stop plastic pollution.110
Annex V of the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (Pollution Prevention Convention) 11 addressed
the problem of plastic pollution from ships by banning ocean disposal
104. This is not to say that concern does not still exist regarding disposal of nu-
clear wastes in the ocean. See Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Dec. 1986, at6 (highlighting discussions of the London Dumping Convention Commission on nuclear
waste issues).
105. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1986, at 26L, col. 3.
106. Id.
107. N.Y. Times, February 17, 1986, at AI6L, col. I.
108. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, done Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165. This Convention,most appropriately referred to as the Ocean Dumping Convention, commonly is called
the London Dumping Convention.
109. See Marine Pollution Bulletin, May 1986.
110. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Dec. 1986, at 7.
111. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973,I.M.C.O. Doe. MP/CONF/WP.35, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter Pol-
lution Prevention Convention]. Annex V, Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution byGarbage from Ships, is one of three optional annexes to the Pollution Prevention Conven-
tion currently under consideration.
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of all plastics, including, but not limited to, synthetic ropes, fishing
nets and plastic bags. Hearings on the Annex were held before the
United States House of Representatives Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries Committee's Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation,
which showed general support for United States acceptance of the
Annex.113 Ratification by the United States, with four percent of the
world's shipping tonnage,114 would constitute a major step toward
the Annex's entry into force.115
The United States' concern about plastics pollution prompted the
introduction of several pieces of legislation directed at the study and
control of the problem. One bill introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives directs appropriate government organizations to conduct
studies on the adverse effects of plastics on land and water, including
fish and wildlife, and to make recommendations for minimizing the
detrimental consequences.116 Another bill introduced in the Senate
would ban the use of nondegradable plastic six-pack yokes in pack-
aging canned beverages. 17 Seven states already have banned the use
of plastic six-pack holders.11 8
Yet another Senate bill proposes several ideas for ways to mini-
mize the use of drift nets and the resulting death of sea life.1 19 In
accordance with the High Seas Convention,120 the bill proposes that
the Secretary of State negotiate cooperative monitoring and assess-
ment programs with all foreign governments applying for permits to
fish within the United States 200-mile economic zone.1 21 The bill
further provides that, to assure compliance, United States observers
112. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, July 1986, at 7.
113. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept. 1986, at 12-13.
114. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, July 1986, at 7.
115. Id. The Annex will enter into force after fifteen nations representing fifty per-
cent of the world's shipping tonnage have ratified it. As of mid-1986, twenty-five coun-
tries representing forty-four percent of the world's tonnage had ratified the Annex.
116. H.R. 5380, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132.CONG. REC. H5886-87 (daily ed. Aug.
11, 1986), would require the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA) and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to conduct a joint study on the
adverse effects of plastic pollution.
117. S. 2596, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S8514 (daily ed. June 25,
1986).
118. Coastal Zone Management, Aug. 22, 1986, at 6. The seven states are Califor-
nia, New York, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, Alaska, Delaware and Connecticut.
Texas has established a committee to address the problem of plastic pollution.
119. S. 2611, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S8709 (daily ed. June 26,
1986).
120. See High Seas Convention, supra note 47.
121. S. 2611, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S8709 (daily ed. June 25,
1986).
must be placed on all foreign vessels fishing within the zone. Also,
the National Marine Fisheries Service would be directed to study
the environmental impact of drift nets and to establish a bounty sys-
tem as an incentive to retrieve nets.12 Finally, a sixty mile wide
"Seabird Protection Zone" would be established, prohibiting drift
nets around the Aleution Islands. 23
Ocean Incineration
The United States took action to stop ocean incineration 124 indefi-
nitely, reflecting growing international concern about the effects of
burning waste products on the environment.
On May 28, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 12r an-
nounced its decision to delay the issuance of a permit for an Atlantic
Ocean incineration off the coasts of Delaware and New Jersey. 126
The proposed burn by Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 127 would
have involved a nineteen day incineration of 700,000 gallons of fuel
oil 12a on board the Vulcanus 11.129 Public hearings on a tentative per-
mit issued by the EPA in December 1985, however, revealed consid-
erable public concern. 130 The hearing officer's report indicated that
several crucial factors had been inadequately considered initially and
recommended further study before the issuance of test burn per-
mits. 13 ' Further study was thought necessary regarding financial re-
sponsibility for potential damages resulting from a burn,132 contin-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ocean incineration involves the burning of certain liquid toxic wastes at sea
aboard specially-adapted tank vessels. The incinerators do not contain an afterburner orpollution control equipment required on land-based incinerators, contributing to thegreater inefficiency of ocean incinerators. Because ocean incinerators can handle only
about eight percent of all hazardous waste generated each year, the possible contributionof ocean incinerators to the world's hazardous waste management is limited. Lentz &
Curtis, EPA Puts the Burn on Ocean Burns, OCEANUS, Spring 1987, at 77.
125. The EPA's authority derives from 33 U.S.C. 1412a(b) (1982).
126. 51 Fed. Reg. 20,344.
127. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. is the worldwide leader in hazardous
waste disposal. Lentz & Curtis, supra note 124, at 76.
128. The fuel to be burned was ten to thirty percent polychlorinated biphenyl liq-
uid waste. See Marine Pollution Bulletin, July 1986.
129. The Vulcanus II, an ocean incinerator, was to be loaded in Philadelphia and
sail to an area 120 nautical miles off the United States northeastern coast. States poten-
tially affected were allowed to review the plan. Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey
had all approved the plan when the EPA acted. Id.
130. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at 6; Lentz & Curtis,supra note 124, at 77. Five public hearings were held and over 1,400 written comments
submitted.
131. Council on Ocean Law, Ocean Pol'y News, June 1986, at 6.
132. Id. Originally, the EPA had suggested that the permit applicant be requiredto demonstrate financial responsibility in the amount of $60 million, much to the conster-
nation of the ocean incineration industry. Under existing law, who pays if an accident
should occur is unclear. Lentz & Curtis, supra note 124, at 78.
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gency planning needs for the land-based portions of the incineration
process and the availability of land-based incinerators as an alterna-
tive to tests at sea. 3
The EPA responded with plans to delay all test burns until it com-
pleted its drafting of regulations on the subject.13 4 Ironically, the
lack of ocean incineration data resulted, in this case, in the cancella-
tion of a burn that would have provided data to the EPA.2
35 Draft
regulations and subsequent public hearings are anticipated in
1988.13"
Europeans also demonstrated their concern about the environmen-
tal effects of ocean incineration. Internationally, the London Dump-
ing Convention 3" regulates ocean incineration; regionally, the Oslo
Convention 138 regulates incineration in the North Sea, where burns
have been conducted since 1969.139 A joint commission meeting of
experts on ocean incineration is slated for 1987.140 Meanwhile, the
Commission of the European Communities proposed to the European
Economic Community Council of Ministers that North Sea burns be
phased out in the next decade.' 4' The proposal called for an end to
the issuance of new incineration permits by 1988, renewal of existing
permits only until 1990 and a reduction of the number of burns by
ten percent annually from 1990 to 1995.142 The British House of
Lords European Communities Committee responded by calling the
133. For information about possible alternatives, see Lentz & Curtis, supra note
124, at 79, and the report cited therein, Ocean Incineration: Its Role in Managing Haz-
ardous Waste from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
134. Lentz & Curtis, supra note 124, at 76; 51 Fed. Reg. 20,344.
135. The chemical waste burn was to be conducted under a research permit linked,
in part, to the EPA's Science Advisory Board's report of April, 1985, indicating deficien-
cies in current knowledge about ocean incineration. The research permit, as initially envi-
sioned, was meant to answer some of the questions raised by the report, yet the inade-
quacy of the proposed research plan was one of the reasons given by the hearing officer
for denying issuance of the permit. Lentz & Curtis, supra note 124, at 76.
136. Id. at 79. Draft regulations first were issued in February 1985 but, following
public comment, were never finalized. Given the need, however, for further research and
the refusal to allow research burns before issuance of the draft regulations, Lentz and
Curtis suggesi that the EPA has put itself into a position that will make drafting of
regulations difficult.
137. See supra note 108.
138. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships
and Aircraft, done February 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S.O., reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 262
(1972).
139. Lentz & Curtis, supra note 124, at 79.
140. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Dec. 1986, at 1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
proposal ill-conceived and inappropriate.143 The future of ocean in-
cineration obviously remains unsettled.
Oilspill Liability
Ongoing efforts by the United States Congress to enact legislation
regarding oil spill liability and to ratify two international agreements
on the same subject met with opposition based on concerns over fed-
eral preemption of existing state laws. Nevertheless, as discussed be-
low, Congress, did authorize funding needed to clean up existing
spills.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage144 and the Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution 145 were supplemented
in 1984 by protocols of the International Maritime Organization.1 46
These protocols quadruple liability limits for tanker owners and the
size of the fund available to compensate spill victims when owners'
liability limits are exceeded.1 47 The United States remains the only
major maritime nation that has not ratified the two agreements be-
cause the Senate considered the initial liability limits too low. 1 48
While the 1984 protocols raised those limits, they also contained a
provision preempting all state and federal legislation on oil spill
damages,1 49 providing another basis for Senate disapproval of the
conventions and protocols. 150
The Reagan Administration pushed for protocol ratification, send-
ing representatives to two Senate committees in support of the
protocols.15' The House of Representatives placed additional
pressure on the Senate by passing a Superfund' 52 reauthorization
143. See Marine Pollution Bulletin, Sept. 1986.
144. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S.O, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970).
145. Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
of Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in I1 I.L.M. 284 (1972).
146. For a discussion related to the protocols, see Jacobson & Trotz, The Defini-
tion of Pollution Damage in the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
and the 1971 Fund Convention, 17 J. MAR. L. & Cort. 467 (1986).
147. Coastal Zone Management, Oct. 9, 1986, at 2. Article 6 of each Protocol
contains the amendment regarding the increase in liability limits.
148. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 14.
149. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at 7.
150. Id. at 6.
151. President Reagan sent the two protocols to the Senate for its advice and con-
sent. Jacobson & Trotz, supra note 146, at 468-69. On April 29, 1936, Secretary of
Transportation Elizabeth Dole appeared before the Senate Environment and PublicWorks Committee. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 13. On
May 15, 1986, Admiral William Kime of the United States Coast Guard and John Neg-
roponte, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, joined Secretary Dole before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at 7.
152. Superfund is a program designed to clean up hazardous waste sites that en-
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bill1 53 preempting state liability systems and clean up compensation
funds and implementing the protocols.15 The Senate's version of the
Superfund bill,' 55 however, did not contain similar provisions. In
conference committee, the House offered to drop consideration of the
protocols from its Superfund legislation if the Senate agreed to pass
within the year independent legislation regarding oil spill liability. 56
Furthermore, the House passed a separate bill consolidating four
existing laws governing oil spill liability. This bill established a com-
prehensive liability and compensation system to govern oil pollution
from vessels, offshore deepwater ports and outer continental shelf fa-
cilities associated with oil production.' 57 Additionally, the bill pro-
hibited eleven coastal states that already have established oilspill
funds from continuing to assess taxes or fees to maintain the pro-
grams.' 58 In effect, the state programs would be preempted within
three years of enactment of the bill.
159
The Senate did introduce independent oil spill liability and com-
pensation legislation, but it specifically stated that state laws would
not be preempted by the minimum standards of the federal pro-
gram. 60 The Senate, however, took no further action. Consequently,
the United States continues to withhold ratification of the interna-
tional conventions and protocols on oil spill liability and
compensation.
ARCTIC/ANTARTICA
The Soviet Union, responding to criticism from environmentalists
both within the country and from other nations, postponed a planned
water diversion from Eastern European rivers flowing into the Arctic
Ocean.' 6 1 Western researchers were concerned that such a large So-
danger public health and safety. See generally, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
153. H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 1941 (1985) (originally
introduced as H.R. 1232).
154. Id.
155. S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 69 (1985). The Superfund
reauthorization, as passed in October 1986, see supra note 152, did not include the
protocols.
156. Council for Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 13.
157. H.R. 1232, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 606 (1985).
158. Id.
159. Coastal Zone Management, April 1986, at 5.
160. S. 2340, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S4542 (daily ed. Apr. 18,
1986).
161. Ryan, Soviets Shelve Plans on Diverting Rivers in Arctic Region, OCEANUS,
Spring 1986, at 78 (characterizing the efforts of Soviet writers to stop the planned diver-
viet river diversion could, by altering the Arctic ice cover, substan-
tially affect the climate of the Northern Hemisphere. 16 2 Such a
water diversion could have a major impact upon fishing, rainfall pat-
terns and navigation as well as the flooding of ancient Russian
towns.163 The water diversion plan was part of the November 1985
draft of a Soviet five year plan for 1986-1990 that called for land
reclamation through the rest of the century."'6 A large water diver-
sion from Siberia to Central Asia also was deleted from the five year
plan.16
5
In Antartica, Greenpeace 6 6 attempted to become a party to the
Antarctic Treaty'67 by establishing a four-person camp for the requi-
site year. 66 The Treaty, however, is open automatically only to
members of the United Nations; other groups, such as Greenpeace,
must be invited to join the Treaty and unanimously approved by ex-isting parties. 69 Presently, the eligibility of the environmental group
to join the Treaty remains uncertain.
THE SOUTH PACIFIC
Increasingly, the island nations of the South Pacific are asserting
their independence in regard to fishing treaties, nuclear weapons and
environmental concerns. 170 Past conflicts between the United States
and sixteen Pacific island nations involving fishing rights'' appar-
sion as "an unusual campaign against the river projects in the state-run media.").
162. Some scientists believe that the freshwater river flow into the Arctic Oceanhas a significant impact on ice conditions, which in turn influence atmospheric pressureand circulation patterns over the entire Northern Hemisphere. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Eighty-four percent of the Soviet Union's river flow enters the Arctic andPacific Oceans. The remaining 16% cross the arid and semiarid southern and westernportions of the country, which are inhabited by 75% of the population, account for eightypercent of economic activity, and contain more than 80% of the country's cropland. Bythe year 2000, 20 cubic kilometers of water were to be diverted southward annually fromthe northern European region. In comparison, the annual Mississippi River flow is 600
cubic kilometers.
165. Id at 79. The Siberian part of the plan received much publicity until Septem-
ber 1985 when all mention of it was deleted from Soviet media. The first phase of theEuropean diversion, designed to transport 5.8 cubic kilometers of water annually to theVolga basin by 1995, reportedly had been started already, costing the Soviets an esti-mated $3 billion. The primary purpose of the diversion was to increase water supplies inthe drainage basin of the Caspian and Azov Seas so as to more adequately meet thearea's future needs for irrigation, hydroelectricity, transportation and fisheries.166. Greenpeace, an environmental organization based in Lewes, England, wasfounded in 1971 by Canadian environmentalists. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1985, at A3, col.
1.
167. Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.
168. See Marine Pollution Bulletin, July 1986.
169. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 167, art. 13, para. 1.
170. See generally Wall St. J., March 5, 1986, at 1, col. 1; L.A. Times, Feb. 22,1987, at I, col. 6; Wall St. J., July 31, 1986, at 34, col. 1.171. For a general discussion of the conflicting United States and South Pacific
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ently were resolved as the United States entered into a tentative
agreement with those nations, but not before several of the island
countries 172 indicated an interest in following the lead of Kiribati by
signing fishing agreements with the Soviet Union in exchange for
financial support. 173 In fact, early in 1987, one of the nations -
Vanuatu - completed an agreement with the Soviets that permits
port calls as well as fishing. 4
In October, United States negotiators were able to reach an agree-
ment with representatives of the Pacific nations on a regional fisher-
ies treaty that will give American tuna vessels access to over ten
million square miles of rich fishing grounds in the South Pacific.
175
Previously, the United States had offered a two-tiered financing
package consisting of $1.5 million in the form of fishing licensing
fees and an additional $4 million in economic aid. The Pacific island
states responded with a demand for $20 million in licensing fees but
demonstrated a willingness to lower that amount in exchange for di-
rect aid payments.'1 6 The October agreement calls for the United
States to provide a minimum of $12 million each year for at least
five years to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, the regional
organization that represented all sixteen nations in the negotiations.
License fees of $1.75 million plus $250,000 in technical assistance,
both provided by the United States tuna fishing industry, will ac-
count for a portion of the aid.' With some details remaining to be
settled, signing of an agreement was anticipated in March, 1987.178
Meanwhile, the United States acted to strengthen its relation with
other Pacific islands. In May, the United States requested that the
United Nations Trusteeship Council end the forty year relationship
between the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
views in regard to fishing rights, see Narakobi, The Tuna Issue: The South Pacific and
the United States, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 370 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
172. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, August 1986, at 6. Fiji, Vanuatu
and Papua New Guinea all began to discuss opening their waters and possibly their ports
to Russian fishing fleets.
173. Wall St. J., July 31, 1986, at 34, col. 1.
174. L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at p. 1, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
1986, at 7, col. I (Soviet negotiations with Vanuatu).
175. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, Pacific
Regional Fisheries Treaty, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1434 (October 23, 1986).
176. See Wall St. J., July 31, 1986, at 34, col. 1. See also Council on Ocean Law,
Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at 3.
177. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, supra
note 175.
178. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan. 1987, at 3.
lands in order to negotiate more favorable agreements. 17 9 The
United States already had established agreements with the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern
Mariana Islands when the Trusteeship Council approved the United
States request in regard to all of the islands.18 The Northern Mari-
anas opted to become a commonwealth of the United States, with
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands signing compacts of free associ-
ation with the United States. 81 Currently unresolved difficulties
arose with regard to Palau due to that nation's constitutional prohi-
bition of nuclear weapons in the country.'82 Although the citizens of
Palau approved a compact of free association with the United States
by a seventy-two percent majority vote, Palau's Supreme Court ruled
that the agreement would require a seventy-five percent approval be-
cause it would allow United States ships carrying nuclear weapons to
stop in Palau contrary to the Paluan Constitution. 183 A subsequent
plebiscite on December 2, 1986, also failed with only two-thirds of
all voters supporting the Compact. 84
Two South Pacific agreements attempting to limit nuclear weap-
ons in the region opened for signature. The South Pacific Regional
Environmental Protection Convention (South Pacific Convention)180
179. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, June 1986, at i. The Territory
consisted of three archipelagos made up of over 2100 islands and atolls. The UnitedStates had administered it on behalf of the United Nations since 1947. See generally
U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986.
180. Approval came (over Soviet disapproval) with passage of Resolution 2183 ofthe United Nations Trusteeship Council. U.N. Chronicle., Aug. 1986, at 70. See alsoProclamation No. 5564, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,399 (1986); Compact of Free Association Act
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986).
181. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 67. The Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia had chosen free association with the United States in 1983. The
Northern Marianas Islands chose commonwealth status in 1975. See 48 U.S.C. § 1681(1982). Following United Nations approval, the agreements with the South Pacific na-
tions went into effect. See Exec. Order No. 12,572, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1987); Exec. OrderNo. 12,569, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1987); Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986).
182. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, May 1986, at 12. The PalaunConstitution prohibits use, testing, storage and disposal of nuclear weapons. The Com-pact of Free Association between Palau and the United States would have permitted the
United States to operate vessels and aircraft with nuclear propulsion or nuclear capacity
to operate within the Palaun jurisdiction without United States confirmation or denial of
the presence or absence of such weapons.
183. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Poly News, Sept. 1986, at 13. The UnitedStates continued to consider ways to implement an agreement with Palua following the
Paluan Supreme Court's ruling.
184. Three attempts were made to achieve Palaun approval of the Compact. Thefirst, in 1983, got only sixty-one percent approval. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 7 1. The
most recent attempt, in December 1986, failed with two-thirds of all voters supporting
the agreement with the United States. Council on Ocean Law, Ocean Pol'y News, Dec.
1986, at 5.
185. Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment ofthe South Pacific Region, done November 25, 1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987).
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originally prohibited all nuclear testing in the region, but later was
modified to prohibit only environmental pollution from nuclear tests
in an effort to make the agreement more attractive to the United
States and France."86 The South Pacific Convention opened for sig-
nature on November 25, 1986 and already seven of the necessary ten
states have signed the Convention and two protocols,
187 including the
United States and France. 88
Additionally, three protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone agreement (Zone Agreement) opened for signature on Decem-
ber 1, 1986.89 The South Pacific Forum, a loose grouping of thirteen
nations, initially concluded the Zone Agreement in an effort to make
the region a nuclear free zone.190 The three protocols then were de-
veloped for signature by nonisland nations. The first, open to
France,1 91 the United States and the United Kingdom only,
' 92 pro-
hibits manufacturing, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in the
region. The second and third, open to the Soviet Union and China as
well, prohibit (1) the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons
against nations with territories in the region and (2) the testing of
nuclear weapons.1 9 The United States has refused to become a
party to the Zone Agreement, arguing that to do so would set a pre-
cedent for similar nuclear free zones in other key military areas.
9
On December 15, 1986, the Soviet Union signed both protocols that
were open to it.'
95
186. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept. 1986, at 11.
187. Protocol for Prevention of Dumping, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 65 (1987); Proto-
col Concerning Combating Pollution, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 59 (1987).
188. Council on Ocean Law, Ocean Pol'y News, Jan. 1987, at 2.
189. Id.
190. The agreement has been ratified by eight island nations, Fiji, the Cook Is-
lands, Niue, Ruvalu, New Zealand, Australia, Kiribati and Western Samoa, bringing it
into force on Dec. I1, 1986. Papau New Guinea and Nauru have signed but not ratified
the agreement. The Solomon Islands, Vanatu and Tonga have not signed the agreement.
Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept. 1986, at 13; Jan. 1987, at 2.
191. France exploded an underground nuclear device, its seventy-third since 1975,
on April 27, 1986, at its Mururoa test site in the South Pacific. New Zealand quickly
protested France's actions. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1986, at A5L, col. 2.
192. These are the three nuclear weapon states with territories within the area of
the agreement. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Sept. 1986, at 13.
193. Id.
194. L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at 14, col. 4.
195. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, Jan. 1987, at 2. The Soviets,
however, included a statement with ratification. This statement provided that the Soviet
ratification was nullified toward any nation that provided aid to other nuclear weapon
states against the Soviets and that the Soviets considered visits to the South Pacific by
nuclear-armed ships contrary to the spirit of the agreement. The agreement itself does
not provide for such statements to be attached to ratifications.
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
United States - Libya
A long-brewing controversy between the United States and Libya
erupted into a military confrontation in March, creating the major
territorial dispute of 1986. The two countries had long been at odds
over Libyan claims to the Gulf of Sidra, a 275 mile wide bay'90 de-
marcated by Libyan leader Muammer Qaddafi's so-called "line of
death." Libya first claimed the Gulf in 1973, when Qaddafi an-
nounced that he considered the Gulf to be Libyan territorial wa-
ters.197 The United States refused to acknowledge Libyan claims to
the Gulf and relied on the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone (Territorial Sea Convention) 9 ' in arguing that
Libya could claim only a twelve mile zone measured from the Lib-
yan coast. 199 The Territorial Sea Convention allows a nation to claim
as internal waters a coastal embayment only if less than twenty-four
miles exist between the low-water marks at the natural entrance of
the employment. 20 0 The United States continued to conduct naval
exercises in the area, crossing the "line of death" seven times since
1981.201
On March 24, the situation finally erupted into violence when Lib-
yan ground batteries fired six missiles at United States planes after a
thirty ship United States Navy task force crossed into the Gulf area
claimed by Libya. 2 The United States responded by attacking two
Libyan patrol boats and a missile site in Libya203 that American offi-
cials deemed to be a threat to the United States. 04 Additional at-
tacks by the United States followed, resulting in a total of five at-
tacks on boats and two on the missile site .20  A few days later,
however, on March 28, United States naval forces withdrew from
the Gulf,20 6 several days before the scheduled end of their exercises.
The United States claimed throughout the week that it intended only
to make "the legal point that beyond the internationally recognized
12-mile limit, the Gulf of Sidra belongs to no one and that all na-
196. See generally Blum, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AM. J. OF INT'L L 668
(1986); see also Comment, The Gulf of Sidra, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 751 (1987).
197. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1986, at All, col. I.
198. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea
Convention].
199. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1986, at All, col. I.
200. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 198, at art. 7, para. 4.
201. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1986, at All, col. 1.
202. Id. at A I, col. 6.
203. Id. at A I0, col. 6.
204. Id. at AI0, col. 1.
205. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1986, at A12, col. 5.
206. Id. at A l, col. 2.
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tions are free to move through international waters and air-
space. .... ,01 Many criticized the action, however, believing that
the United States was attempting to provoke Qaddafi into direct acts
of violence so that the United States could attack Libya for its per-
ceived role in worldwide terrorism.
20 8
The United Nations Security Council (Council) met several times
to consider the Libyan-United States confrontation.209 Both nations
claimed to be acting in self-defense. 10 The Council took no action
because three permanent members of the Council - the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France - cast vetos against a res-
olution which would have condemned the United States' "armed at-
tack" against Libya.211
Other Conflicts
An Argentinian attack on Taiwanese fishing trawlers near the Fal-
kland Islands in May left one Taiwanese fisherman dead.212 The Ar-
gentine government admitted that a coast guard cutter had fired on
the trawlers found operating within the 200 mile restricted fishing
zone claimed by Argentina. The trawler caught fire and was aban-
doned. Three other crewmen also were injured. 13
The Falklands continue to be a center of controversy between
Great Britain and Argentina following the 1982 war between the
two nations. After the Argentine surrender in June 1982, Britain im-
posed a 150 mile exclusion zone around the islands, which are about
300 miles from the Argentine coast. The exclusion applies only to
Argentine ships.214 Argentina claimed that foreign fishing fleets have
used the British zone as a base for excursions into the 200 mile
coastal zone off the Argentine mainland in which Argentina restricts
international fishing.
215
The sinking of the Taiwanese trawler followed Argentine deten-
tion of other ships caught within 200 miles of the Argentine coast.
The sinking of the Taiwanese boat, however, was especially surpris-
207. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1986, at A10, col. 5.
208. Id. at All, col. 2; N.Y. Times, March 27, 1986, at A8, col. 5.
209. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 46.
210. Id. at 47-48.
211. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 46. In November 1986, however, the United
Nations General Assembly condemned the attack which it said "constitutes violation of
the United Nations Charter and of international law." U.N. Chronicle, Feb. 1987, at 73.
212. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1986, at A5, col. 3-5.
213. Id. at A5, col. 4-5.
214. Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1986, at 12, col. 1.
215. Id.
ing because the Taiwanese boat was fired upon while in a 200 mile
zone as measured from the Falklands instead of the Argentine main-
land.216 Britain responded to Argentina's expansion of its exclusive
zone by announcing in October that it was extending its fishing zone
around the islands from three to 200 miles . 17 As of February 1,
1987, all fishing within 150 miles of the Falklands will require a
British license.218
SHIPPING
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of
Ships (Registration Convention) opened for signature on May 1,1986.219 The Registration Convention centers on stricter vessel regis-
tration requirements,22 o focusing on the desireability of a "genuine
link" between a vessel and the country with which it is registered.22'
The Registration Convention will enter into force when ratified by
forty states whose combined vessel tonnage amounts to at least
twenty-five percent of the world registered tonnage.222
CONCLUSION
Many positive steps regarding the law of the sea were taken in
1986, including actions designed to preserve the many resources of
the sea, ranging from minerals to animal life. Increasing attention to
various sources of pollution, ranging from plastics and oilspills to the
by-products of ocean incineration, also presents hope for the future
of the sea. While political disputes, most noteably the United States-
Libya confrontation, occupied the headlines, overall 1986 was
largely a favorable year for the law of the sea.
HEIDI E. BROWN
216. Id. at 12, col. 3. Both Japanese and Polish ships had been detained in the
month prior to the sinking of the Taiwanese boat.
217. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1986, at A3, col. 4.
218. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1!, 1986, at A6, col. 2.
219. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 121.
220. Id.
221. The concept of a genuine link was stressed in both the 1958 Geneva Conven-tion on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5(I) 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82, and the LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 91. See U.N. Chronicle,
Jan. 1984, at 93.
222. U.N. Chronicle, Aug. 1986, at 121.
